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Abstract
Generally, software requirement analysis and design methodologies based on dif-
ferent UML (Unified Modelling Language) diagrams need to be strengthened by
the use of a number of security patterns. Security Patterns provide a way for
the software developers to communicate at security level in more comprehensive
way. Over the last few years, a number of security patterns has been gradually
increased and still increasing. Large number of security patterns has given rise to
critical problem of selecting the appropriate security pattern to solve the problem
at hand. In this study, an attempt has been made for automated verification of
security pattern and an approach is proposed for selection of appropriate security
patterns that fulfils security requirements. In order to demonstrate this approach,
four security patterns have been selected such as Single Access Point, CheckPoint,
Role and Session. A grammar has been developed for the verification of selected
security patterns. Goal-Oriented Requirement Language (GRL) has been used for
creating the repository of formalized security patterns, this GRL model is used
for extracting facts which are then represented as relational instances. Queries
have been made to the instances to find appropriate security pattern which ful-
fils security requirements. This approach clearly identifies the contribution and
consequences of a security pattern towards the security related Non Functional Re-
quirements (NFRs). It also checks for the relationships and dependences among
the security patterns, which helps in finding the pre-requisite patterns for the se-
lected security patterns. Finally, a method for detection of security patterns using
similarity score is presented.
Keywords : Security Patterns, Formalization, Selection, Detection.
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31.1 Introduction
In the past two decades, a good number of software patterns have been proposed
by researchers [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]. Many design pattern tools have also been
developed for detecting patterns in instantiating of design patterns [8]. Gamma et
al. [1] have proposed the concept of software design patterns which consist of the
standard templates for twenty three design patterns. Later, other software design
patterns used these templates as a base and further extended these templates for
their application area.
The security requirements of a system depend on the environment in which
system is developed. In the present day scenario, the aspect of software security is
different from end-to-end security requirements of an application. Security prin-
ciples say that by eliminating security risks at the functional and developmental
level, security business objects, data across logical tiers, and security communica-
tions can be improved. Also the protection of the application from unauthorized
internal and external threats and vulnerabilities need to be ascertained. For the
first time security patterns have been proposed by Yoder and Barcalow [9]. They
have proposed seven patterns which are applied in security development issues.
Later, a good number of other categories of security patterns have been intro-
duced [5] [6] [10]. In order to demonstrate our approach four security patterns
such as Single Access Point, Check Point, Session, and Role have been taken into
consideration. These security patterns are described as follows:
The single Access Point limits extraneous access to a single channel and fa-
cilitates control which may be used in any self-contained system communicating
with others. Single Access Point security pattern provides a scheme for static de-
sign of a system. Many systems can’t be protected against outside attacks due to
numerous access points. Hence, the main objective of Single Access Point is to de-
fine one single interface for all external entities to communicate with system. The
Single Access Point is used at the network-level as well as the application-level.
The UML class diagram for Single Access Point is shown in Figure 1.1. Three
participants for Single Access Point (SAP) are ’Internal Entity’, ’Single Access
Point’, and ’External Entity’. External Entities are the actors which are outside
the system and should be authenticated before they can communicated with the
system. They communicate with the system through Single Access Point. Internal
Entities are the components present inside the system which is accessible to the
4external entities only when authenticated by Single Access Point available to the
external entities.
Figure 1.1: Single Access Point Security Pattern
The Single Access Point (SAP) class interacts with any class that needs to
communicate with external entities. All the security policies that are to be en-
forced, must be sent to Check Point class before requests are forwarded to their
intended recipients. Check Point performs a check for security policies that are to
be applied on system and penalizes the user for violation of security policies.
A Single Access Point is predesigned to be combined with Check Point. Class
diagram for Check Point is shown in Figure 1.2. Check Point class acts as an
Internal Entity to the Single Access Point class and checks for information flow
through this class. Three participants for Check Point security pattern are Check
Point, Countermeasure and Security Policy. The Check Point class implements a
method to check information according to the current security policy and triggers
action to protect system against attackers. Countermeasure class provides actions
to be triggered in order to react against access violation. Security Policy class
implements rules that are applied to determine whether an access or condition is
allowed or not.
Check Point grants access to the system for authorized users. The user must
be validated for the authorization areas of the system according to the role that
particular user plays. Validation and verification for user’s privileges are incor-
porated through Role Based Access Control (RBAC) security pattern. The class
diagram for RBAC is shown in Figure 1.3. RBAC security pattern aims for better
maintainability of the privileges in the system. RBAC security pattern is real-
ized by constructing a User-Role-Privilege relationship. The different participants
taking action in RBAC security pattern are Privilege and Role. Privilege class
defines the resources which are accessible to subjects that has been afforded to
5Figure 1.2: Check Point Security Pattern
this privilege. Role class holds a set of privileges those are related to that specific
role object and furnishes information about the users and its privileges.
Figure 1.3: RBAC Security Pattern
Session security pattern deals with creation of object which keeps global infor-
mation about a user. This may be used to facilitate accountability and to enforce
privilege violations. Session objects keep security relevant information like roles,
privileges or authentication data. Session object may be created after the user logs
into the system which is to be done at the Check Point of system. The UML class
diagram for Session security pattern is shown in Figure 1.4. The participants of
this security pattern are Session and the System components which uses Session.
Session class stores information which are provided by Session. The stored infor-
mation are initialized on creation. System components, which use Session, know
the instance of the Session object they use, and call methods of session to retrieve
information.
According to Yoder and Barcalow [9], secure system should maintain a proper
associativity among different security patterns. In this study, four security patterns
6Figure 1.4: Session Security Pattern
such as Single Access Point, Check Point, Session, and Role have been taken
into consideration. One of the important measures of security is Single Access
Point which limits the entry to the system only through a single entry point.
Single Access Point provides user identification related information to Check Point
for authentication and authorization of the user. When user identification has
been verified, Session is created for carrying the global variables which contain
user’s identification and role. The authorization area for system visualization and
modification is provided through role-privilege relationship. Figure 1.5 represents
the flow of associativity among the aforesaid patterns in order to provide a secure
system.
Single Access Point 
Checkpoint 
Role Session 
Secure Policy 
uses
Creates
might use 
Used to ceate 
has 
interacts with
Creates
Figure 1.5: Pattern Language for selected patterns
Design of an application system at present is supposed to be based on different
UML diagrams. UML class diagram shows the structural aspects of the classes,
but it is unable to express some other behavioral aspects. Hence, the extension of
UML class diagram to visualize the design pattern methodology has been proposed
7in [11]. A gradual evolution has been observed for representation of design patterns
in UML class diagram, including Venn diagram style notation, Dotted-Bounding
Pattern Annotation, and Tagged Value Notation. Tagged Value notation defines
the pattern-role behavior of the model elements such as classes, attributes, and
operations. These notation can also be used for representation of security patterns.
Dong et al. [12] have presented a UML profile that defines new stereotypes, tagged
values, and constraints for tracing design patterns in UML diagrams. In this study,
these notations [12] are used for improving analysis of security problem.
The role of formal methods in the area of design patterns is helpful to enhance
the understandability of their semantics. It can help to analyse the composition
of design patterns. In the verification and validation scenario, the design must
be checked for correct use of the design patterns. There are many advantages
of formal notations to improve design decisions. Formal notations provide new
methods to prove the correctness of the proposed design, to automatically check
the syntax and semantics of the design decisions, and to generate test cases [13].
The verification and validation of any requirement are being carried out by the
use of formal languages which are based on grammar and have certain production
rules. Large numbers of formal specification languages are available in the litera-
ture. Each language has its own syntax and semantics. The limitation of formal
language is that a single formal specification language can’t be applied universally
for all types of problems. For example, Taibi and Ngo [14] proposed a balanced
approach between structural and behavioral aspect, but the approach does not
provide any information like the role of the participating model elements such as
classes, attributes, and methods in a particular design pattern.
Different approaches have been proposed to deal with the problem of selecting
appropriate security patterns. Prevailing approaches emphasize on formalization
of security pattern in order to create the repository. Formalization of security pat-
tern provide the clear description of the structure of security pat-terns. Structure
of security pattern helps the software developer in understanding, how the security
pattern can be applied but it does not provide any information on when a security
pattern should be applied for a given security related problem.
In this study, formal specification in the form of grammar is proposed for
verification of security patterns. The extended UML class diagram is verified by
ANTLR using proposed grammar. All the security goals as intended by selected
8security pattern are preserved after the verification of extended UML class dia-
gram. A centralized repository for storing security pattern is created. Queries has
been made to the repository in order to find the most appropriate design pattern
that fulfills Non Functional Requirements. A approach using similarity score has
been proposed in order to detect the security patterns from the provided source
code of a system.
1.2 Objective
Security is one of several non-functional requirement that software developers have
to consider during the software development lifecycle [18]. Recently, applications
have become increasingly large and complex and developers might now have the
kind of security expertise that the design of security system requires. Security
Patterns bridge the knowledge gap between software developers in different do-
mains, and especially between software security specialists and software designers.
A security pattern [15] is a well-understood and well-formed solution to a recurring
software design security problem. So, security patterns encapsulate the knowledge
accumulated by security experts in order to help software developers to develop a
secure software system
As the requirement for security of today’s systems is continuously increasing,
the number of security is also gradually increasing. Recently many number of
security patterns has been proposed by researchers. Rising’s Pattern directory
[16] has listed more than twelve hundred patterns. In the past ten years since the
publication of the Rising pattern directory, many new patterns book related to
security pattern have been published. In 2007 list of two thousand two hundred and
forty one patterns focusing solely software was given by Henninger and Correa [17].
Increase in number of security can be considered as beneficial for the development
of secure system but it gave given rise to new critical problem, the problem of
selection the most appropriate pattern from the pool containing many security
pattern. The problem of selecting pattern was first highlighted by Gamma (also
known as GoF), he said that it can be hard to find most appropriate pattern for
the problem at hand from the pool containing more than twenty patterns [17].
In this study, after the formalization of security pattern using grammar, GRL
model has been used to represent the contribution that a security pattern make
9on the security related Non Functional Requirements (NFRs), it identifies which
NFR will be build and which NFR will be hurt by the use of particular security
pattern. GRL modelling also helps in visualizing the different relationship among
the patterns such as, weather a pattern can co-exist with other patterns and what
are the prerequisite patterns for the particular pattern. Therefore, GRL model is
used for creating a repository of security pattern. Facts are extracted from the
GRL model which is then represented in the form of Instances. Queries are made
to these instances for finding the appropriate security pattern that fulfils security
requirement.
1.3 Organization of the thesis
The thesis is organized as follows.
In chapter 2, the literature survey is provided, which focuses on different works
that has already been undertaken in the field of formalization, validation, selection
and detection of security patterns .
In chapter 3, a methodology for the formal verification of selected security pat-
terns has been discussed. Developed grammar which satisfies the proposed pattern
language has been explained.
In chapter 4, a methodology for the selection of appropriate security patterns
has been proposed. Implementation details of the approach is also shown in the
same chapter.
In chapter 5, a methodology for detection of security patterns using similarity
score have been propose. Open source projects have been considered to find cor-
rectness of the proposed method.
In chapter 6 presents the concluding remarks with a focus on future research
directions that could be undertaken.
Chapter 2
Literature Survey
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2.1 Formalization and Validation of Security Pat-
terns
The very first notation used for identification of design patterns in UML diagram
was Venn Diagram style Pattern Annotation [19]. In this method, the model
elements participating under the same pattern are clustered together. The concept
is well accepted for small system, but clustering of elements in a larger system was
not possible due to the lack of simplicity and overlapping of clusters. This method
simply shades the cluster with a color in order to make it distinguishable from
other ones, but still it was not widely accepted for large system.
In order to prevent the shortcoming of shading problem of Venn Diagram style
Pattern Annotation, the Dotted Bounding Pattern Annotation was developed by
Dong [20]. But still the notations were imprecise to decide the exact role of the
model elements which they play under the particular design pattern.
Berner et al. have proposed a notation based on UML stereotypes called as
restrictive stereotype [21]. The method defined the design pattern and role of
the model elements participating in a system. But, the stereotype notation was
difficult to handle in terms of expensiveness of designing, using and maintaining the
notation. Also, their approach was not clear about how to extend UML stereotype
notation to represent the compositions of design patterns.
Dong have proposed a new notation to represent explicitly the roles of each
class, operation, and attribute in a pattern, which is based on an extension to
UML [11]. The extension was defined mainly by applying the UML built-in exten-
sibility mechanisms. The new notation was called as Tagged Pattern Annotation.
This method also fulfilled the drawbacks of the Stereotype Annotation Pattern by
allowing the representation of composition of design patterns.
T.Taibi and D.C.L. Neo [14] proposed a formal notation known as, BPSL
(Balanced Pattern Specification Language). The main aim of this language was
to combine two subsets of Logic, one from First Order Logic (FOL) and other
from Temporal Logic of Actions (TLA). According to authors, BPSL has carefully
chosen the subsets of FOL and TLA to be used in order to be simple for users
and yet described design patterns accurately. The ultimate purpose of BPSL is to
help users to understand patterns to know exactly when and how to use them.
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Dong et al. [22] proposed an approach to automate the verification of the
compositions of security patterns by model checking. They formally described
the behavioral aspect of security patterns in CCS (Calculus of Communicating
Systems) through their sequence diagram. They also proved the faithfulness of
the transformation from a sequence diagram to its CCS representation. In their
research, they used two case studies to demonstrate their approach and shown
its capability to detect composition errors. Dwivedi and Rath [23] formalized
a complex architectural style i.e., C2 (Component and Connector) using formal
modeling language Alloy. They have considered cruise control system as a case
study.
Bayley and Zhu [24] proposed a meta modeling approach toward formaliza-
tion of design patterns. This approach enables formal reasoning about patterns
and their composition, transformation, and facilitates automatic tool support for
applying patterns at the design stage. For the case study, authors have formally
specified all 23 Gamma’s design patterns. They claimed that the class diagram
of facade pattern given by GoF [1] is not even well formed and cannot be taken
at facevalue in terms of either the number of classes or their interconnections.
Dwivedi and Rath [25] have formalized an architectural style C2 using formal
modeling languages Alloy and Promela. For the model checking of these formal
notations, automated verifiers such as Alloy Analyzer and SPIN are used.
Dey and Bhattacharya [26] have proposed a formal specification language
FSDP (Formal Specification of Design Pattern) to formally specify design patterns
from UML class diagram. They have used ANTLR (ANother Tool for Language
Recognition) for verification of their developed grammar. They developed a tool
from FSDP grammar to formally automate pattern design techniques, to create,
store, and retrieve UML class diagrams within design patterns. The proposed
grammar is only able to verify the notation [11] for representing design patterns in
extended UML class diagram. Grammar verifies textual format of extended UML
class diagram but it does not check associativity between the different design pat-
terns and it also fails to check correct placement of roles for design patterns.
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2.2 Selection of Appropriate Security Patterns
To select a precise implementation for a software design a cognitive model was
developed by Hinojosa [27]. This cognitive model deals with the behavioural design
patterns from Gamma et al. [17] because of the implementation strategies implied
by those patterns. A reasoning engine based on Prolog language was developed,
which consumed the set of features that were mapped to the patterns. Real world
implementation decision data was used in order to deduce which feature will help in
guiding engineers to a specific implementation. Thus, providing a set of relevantly
appropriate features for each behavioural design pattern. This approach provides
a cognitive model for human reasoning for selecting appropriate security pattern.
However, it is observed that this approach is not applicable in various domain and
this approach is not sufficiently scalable, because all patterns are required to be
transformed manually into sets of predicates. Decisions for selection of appropriate
patterns should also be manually processed.
Patterns-Box tool for assisting software developers in designing a software
architecture was developed by Albin Amiot et al. [28]. All the pattern were
modelled with the help of Formal Pattern Description Language (PDL), in order
to create the repository. For the selecting appropriate pattern, formal model for
current application context has been used. Patterns-Box tool also provides the
HTML interface to navigate between the patterns. However, it is observed that
this approach did not emphasize on relationship and dependencies among the
patterns
Design pattern recommendation system which satisfies the contextual require-
ments such as security, privacy was proposed by Pearson and Shen [29]. Rules
based engine was developed which takes context requirement of the required de-
sign as an input. For selecting appropriate pattern, engine triggers decision about
pattern based on the input. This approach is targeted to help non expert software
architects and developers. Patterns are connected with rules, which make them
independent of the representation format. Therefore patterns and rules much be
created based on the industry practices in each domain. This system is an expert
system which takes selection decision based on the knowledge represented in form
of rules.
An approach for selecting appropriate design patterns that fulfills the non func-
tional requirements of the architectural design was presented by Wang et al. [30].
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A prioritized list of suitable patterns for a specific set of requirements is retrieved
with the help of Non Functional Requirements (NFR) framework. AND or OR
relationships for each pattern is identified hierarchically. These relationships are
then used for analysis of the traceability from the software design components to
the software architecture components. Appropriate applicability of design pattern
is obtained by the use the NFR framework.
Goal-Oriented Requirement Language (GRL) that formalizes the relation be-
tween the patterns and forces of patterns was proposed by Mussbacher et al. [31].
The formalization and clear representation of forces enables trade-off analysis of
forces during the selection of appropriate security patterns. Formalization of se-
curity pattern with the help of GRL graphs helps in capturing the pattern forces,
and it also helps in assessing the qualitative influence on numerous solutions to re-
quired functional goal. GRL model also helps in identifying the relationships and
dependencies among the patterns. Therefore this approach supports selections of
combinations of security patterns. At the moment author did not provide any tool
based on this selection approach.
Weiss and Mouratidis [32] have extended the work of Mussbacher et al. [31].
Formalization was done with the help of same GRL model. Their approach ap-
pends few more steps to the approach followed by the Mussbacher et al. [31].
Facts were extracted from the GRL model and were stored in Prolog for reason-
ing. For selecting appropriate security pattern user makes query to the Prolog
engine, which returns the list of security patterns which fulfils the requirements
specified in the query. Subsequently, this approach also check for the relationship
and dependencies among the pattern and return the list of prerequisite patterns.
However, Prolog is client side language updating security pattern repository will
be tedious tasks and it is observed that it is difficult to provide centrally man-
aged pool of security pattern using this approach. This work is the extension of
the work done by Weiss and Mouratidis[32]. In this study approach repository of
security pattern is stored centrally in server and an interface is provided to make
query to the repository in order to get the list of appropriate security pattern.
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2.3 Detection of Security Patterns
A system has been developed by Prechelt and Kramer [33] to detect a number of
design patterns present in C++ source code. They have built OMT class diagrams,
which incorporates design patterns, to provide Prolog rules. Hence, new Prolog
rules were proposed to detect the design pattern instances.
Wendehals [34] has proposed a method to detect the design pattern instances
present in a system by using the combination of static and dynamic analysis. UML
class diagrams are used to retrieve static information and dynamic information was
extracted from Collaboration or Sequence Diagrams.
Heuzeroth et al. [35] have proposed a methodology to perform static analysis to
obtain pattern candidates, and dynamic analysis of pattern instances was carried
out on the previously obtained candidate sets from static analysis. Since, static
and dynamic analysis are dependent on the formation of design patterns, distinct
algorithms are needed to perform the static and dynamic analysis for each design
pattern. Hence, it is difficult to develop an automated design pattern detection
methodology.
A technique has been proposed by Antoniol et al. to detect structural pat-
terns in a software system [36]. The approach uses metrics to identify probable
pattern candidates, and distance measures are considered for roles in the patterns
in the next stage. In the final stage, delegation constraints are generated. The
three stage approach aims at reducing search space. Final pattern instances are
identified based on structural information. Therefore, this approach has got very
low precision for pattern matching.
Balanyi et al. have proposed an approach to extract the abstract semantic
graph as well as DPML (Design Pattern Markup Language) by the help of Colum-
bus reverse engineering framework [37] [38]. The proposed approach matches roles
present in the DPML files, and the exploration space is reduced by filtering based
on structural information. This approach performs exact matching, hence it can’t
identify modified pattern versions.
Tsantails et. al. have proposed a methodology to detect a design pattern
based on similarity scoring between graph vertices which is capable of recognizing
patterns that are modified from their standard representations [39]. Instead of
relying on pattern-specific heuristic, the approach reduces the search space by
16
taking the fact into consideration that pattern resides in one or more inheritance
hierarchies.
Chapter 3
Formalization and Validation of
Security Patterns
17
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3.1 Formalization and Validation of Security Pat-
terns
In this study, a formal specification in the form of grammar is proposed for ver-
ification and validation of security patterns. Proposed grammar is based on the
pattern language which is shown in Figure 1.5. Four basic security patterns taken
into consideration are Single Access Point, Check Point, Session, and RBAC. The
system may contain other security patterns, but presence of security patterns in a
particular association is of very much significance for secure system. Any language
which is accepted by the proposed grammar, may be said to preserve security as-
pects. The extended UML diagram is verified with the help of proposed grammar.
User is able to define security patterns as well as the role to define the be-
havioral characteristics of model elements such as class, attribute, and method.
The main aim of this study is to verify the associativity of Pattern-Class contain-
ing security patterns. A system having pattern language of security patterns as
shown in Figure 1.5, is abide to preserve security. Proposed grammar can verify
extended UML class diagram against the pattern language shown in Figure 1.5.
The grammar is developed according to the specification of ANTLR. The parser
rule and lexer rules for the proposed grammar are given in Figure 3.1 and Figure
3.2 respectively.
3.1.1 Explanation of Grammar:
The class associativity file contains the association of classes, i.e. classes associated
to a class either by association, by dependency, by generalization or by aggrega-
tion. The first rule verifies the validity of the class. Simultaneously, it checks
for the syntax for declaring security patterns associated with the class. The class
name must be a valid declaration, and must be having the pattern SingleAccess-
Point and role ExternalEntity.
classDecl : className sapExternal;
sapExternal : LEFTBRACE ( patternSAP (patternInstance)? SLASH role-
SAPExternal (COMMA)?)+ ((COMMA)? patternName (patternInstance)? SLASH
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Figure 3.1: Parser Rules
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Figure 3.2: Lexer Rules
role)* RIGHTBRACE classSAPSingleton;
Above rule indicates class declaration must be according to the syntax
ClassName{PatternName[Instance]/Role}
The parser rule for patternSAP is as follows:
patternSAP : SINGLEACCESSPOINT;
The lexer rule for SINGLEACCESSPOINT is as follows:
SINGLEACCESSPOINT : ’SAP’;
(patternInstance)? says that the rule may or may not contain patternInstance,
which means it is optional. Pattern instance is used when a same security pattern
is present more than once in a UML class diagrams. Basically, patternInstance
helps to distinguish between different roles of same security patterns.
patternInstance : LEFTBRACKET instanceNo RIGHTBRACKET;
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The above rule can be explained with the help of an example, [1], [2], .......
or [9] etc is accepted by the rule patternInstance. Here, ’[1]’ represents the first
presence of the security pattern, ’[2]’ represents the second presence of same secu-
rity pattern and so on.
The parser rule for roleSAPExternal is as follows:
roleSAPExternal : EXTENTITY;
The lexer rule for EXTENTITY is as follows:
EXTENTITY : ’ExternalEntity’;
((COMMA)? patternName (patternInstance)? SLASH role)* :
The above grammar says that the rule ”((COMMA)? patternName (patternIn-
stance)? SLASH role)” may occur multiple number of times or it may not occur.
Which signifies that each class must play at least one role of any security pattern.
If a class does not contain any security pattern then it should be in the form
classnameNull/Null.
The rule sapExternal enforces the presence of the pattern SingleAccessPoint
having the role ExternalEntity. The class may play any other role under any other
security pattern, but presence of SingleAccessPoint and the role ExternalEntity
is must. The presence of stereotype defined as SAP/ExternalEntity is verified by
this rule.
The rule sapExternal leads to the verification of the security pattern SAP/S-
ingleton by using another rule classSAPSingleton. The reason to choose Singleton
as the role is to provide single access point to the user. Definition of rule calssS-
APSingleton is given below:
classSAPSingleton : LEFTBRACKET className sapSingleton;
sapSingleton : LEFTBRACE ( patternSAP (patternInstance)? SLASH roleSAPS-
ingleton (COMMA)?)+ ((COMMA)? patternName (patternInstance)? SLASH
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role)* RIGHTBRACE (RIGHTBRACKET)? classCheckPoint;
The parser rule for roleSAPSingleton is as follows:
roleSAPSingleton : SAPSINGLETON;
The lexer rule for SAPSINGLETON is as follows:
SAPSINGLETON : ’Singleton’;
The class declaration may or may not contain other pattern-role pair, but it
must contain at least one matching pattern of SAP/Singleton. This constraint is
verified by the rule sapSingleton.
Association of external entity and singleton under the pattern Single Access
Point leads to the verification of class containing pattern SAP/Singleton asso-
ciated with another class containing patterns SAP/InternalEntity and Check-
Point/CheckPoint. This constraint is verified by using the rule classCheckPoint.
Definition of rule classCheckPoint is given below:
classCheckPoint : LEFTBRACKET className checkPoint;
checkPoint : LEFTBRACE ( patternCheckPoint (patternInstance)? SLASH
roleCPCheckPoint (COMMA)?)+ ((COMMA)? patternSAP (patternInstance)?
SLASH roleSAPInternal)+ ((COMMA)? patternName (patternInstance)? SLASH
role)* RIGHTBRACE (RIGHTBRACKET)? classSecurityPolicy;
The sample of assosiation text file generated from the extended UML diagrams
is shown in Figure 3.3. The result generated by using the grammar proposed by
Dey and Shouvik [26] is shown is Figure 3.4 , Figure 3.5, and Figure 3.6. Figure
3.4 shows the command prompt output. Figure 3.5, and Figure 3.6 shows the
parse tree generated by ANTLR tool.
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Customer { SAP/ExternalEntity} 
 [Login { SAP/Singleton} 
   [ Verification{CheckPoint/CheckPoint, SAP/InternalEntity} 
     [ SecurePolicies{CheckPoint/SecurityPolicy}  
       Penalties{CheckPoint/CounterMeasure}  
       Sesssions{Session/Session} 
       ManagingRoles{RABC/Role} 
       [ UserPrivileges{RABC/Privilege}  
          Sessions{Session/Session}  
       ] 
     ] 
   ]   
 ] 
 
Figure 3.3: Class Association File
Figure 3.4: Result : ANTLR Command Prompt
Figure 3.5: Result : ANTLR Parser Tree 1
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Figure 3.6: Result - ANTLR Parser Tree 2
3.2 Case study
In order to demonstrate this approach, case study of online banking system have
been considered. Nowadays, customers need more personal security, more advo-
cacy and, more control in their banking relationships. The major challenge with
different banks is that they are looking to gain the flexibility, shared services, easy
to use and align business to technology. The solution of above challenges can be
found with the help of security patterns. In online banking system, customer per-
forms online financial transactions, which requires more security provision. The
UML class diagram and extended UML class diagram for the online banking sys-
tem are presented in Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8 respectively.
Figure 3.7 shows the class diagram of Online Banking System for incorporating
security features. This diagram contains eleven classes such as Customer, Login,
Verification, SecurePolicies, Penalities, Sessions, ManagingRoles, UserPrivileges,
AccountManagement, TransferFund, and BalanceEnquiry. Figure 3.7 is extended
for the visualization of security patterns. Extended UML class diagram along with
the visualization of security patterns is represented in Figure 3.8. Explanation of
security patterns as visualized in extended UML class diagrams and how these
security pattern help in achieving the security goals is explained in the following
paragraphs.
For an online banking system, customer is the external entity to interact
with the system.To provide clearly defined entrance to all the external entities
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Figure 3.7: UML Class Diagram for Case Study
SAP(Single Access Point) security pattern is considered.Customer class plays the
role of ExternalEntity which is a participant of SingleAccessPoint security pat-
tern. Therefore, stereotype notation for Customer class is Customer {SAP / Ex-
ternalEntity} which is represented as ’CLASSNAME {PATTERN NAME/ROLE
NAME}’. Customer opens the login screen to enter the system which is the only
entry point to the system. Accordingly, stereotype notation for Login class is
{SAP / Singleton}.
Customer authenticates itself by providing his required authentication infor-
mation, this information is used for the verification of customer identity. Ver-
ification class verifies this information and authenticates the user depending on
the security policies enforced by the system. CheckPoint security pattern is used
for implementing security policies as required by the system and it is also used
for penalizing the user for violating security policies. Verification class also plays
the role of InternalEntity under the security pattern SingleAccessPoint. After the
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Figure 3.8: Extended UML class Diagram for Case Study
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addition of roles, stereotype annotation for Verification class becomes Verification
{SingleAccessPoint/ InternalEntity, CheckPoint/CheckPoint}.
User authentication is checked in Verification class and if the user is not iden-
tified, then method of Verification class triggers an action to impose penalty. The
Penalties class performs a role of CounterMeasure under the pattern CheckPoint.
Stereotype annotation of Penalties class becomes {CheckPoint/CounterMeasure}.
After the authentication of user, system needs to identity the authorized area and
restricted area for identified user, for this purpose RABC (Role Based Access Con-
trol) security pattern is used. When user is authenticated, its role is retrieved from
the class ManagingRoles which plays the role of Role under the Role Based Access
Control security pattern and its authorized area is retrieved from class UserPrivi-
leges which plays the role of Privilege user the security pattern RBAC.Class which
plays the role of Privilege must be associated with the class which plays the role
of Role under the security pattern RBAC.
After the verification and recognition of the role and privileges of user, session
must be created to store the global variables in order to keep track of the user
identification information such identity, role and privilege. All other classes devel-
oped for handling actions such as transfer, withdrawal , deposit are supposed to be
attached to session class, because session contains the global variables which hold
information about the role and privileges of user. Session security pattern has
been used for creating session and for storing global variables in order to secure
the restricted areas. Sessions class performs the role of Session under the Session
security pattern. All the other classes such as BalanceEnquiry, AccountManage-
ment, TransferFund play the role of system component which uses sessions.
The above details show, how the four selected security pattern are helpful in
archiving desired security goals. Every system which aims at providing a single
entry point, user authentication, role and privileges for user, and needs to maintain
session, can be made secure at the time of system design by applying four selected
security patterns according to the pattern language shown in Figure 1.5.
The association text file is generated generate from Extended UML class dia-
gram with security patterns is the parsed in the grammar and the class Association
file generated looks like as given in Figure 3.3. Generated class association file is
verified according to the grammar developed for pattern language shown in Figure
1.5.
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Figure 3.9: Result - ANTLR Command Prompt
Figure 3.10: Result - ANTLR Parser Tree
3.2.1 Test Cases
In order to explain the verification process, we have considered three test cases as
shown in the Figure 3.11, Figure 3.12, and Figure 3.13. These test cases are the
class associativity text files generated from the class text of extended UML class
diagram.
First test case shown in Figure 3.11 is generated from the extended UML class
diagram which is shown in Figure 3.8. This test case is accepted by the proposed
grammar because it strictly follows the pattern language shown in Figure 1.5.
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Figure 3.11: Test-Case 1
Figure 3.12: Test-Case 2
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Figure 3.13: Test-Case 3
Second test case shown in Figure 3.12 satisfies all the production rules accord-
ing to the proposed grammar which is developed for pattern language shown in
Figure 1.5. Therefore, it is accepted by the proposed grammar. Difference be-
tween the first and second test case is as follows: First test case does not contain
any security pattern other than the four selected security patterns, for which the
pattern language is composed. Second test case contains four selected security
patterns as well as other Gamma et.al. design patterns but at the same time it is
in accordance with proposed pattern language as shown in Figure 1.5.
Third test case shown in Figure 3.13 will not be accepted by the proposed
grammar. Because, the very first line containing the class declaration of Cus-
tomer class does not contain the pattern {SAP/ExternalEntity}, also the Verifi-
cation class must contain the pattern {SAP/InternalEntity} along with the pattern
{CheckPoint/CheckPoint} in order to comply with the proposed language. The
result generated by using improved grammar is shown is Figure 3.9 and, Figure
3.10. Figure 3.9 shows the command prompt output. Figure 3.6 shows the parser
tree generated by ANTLR tool.
Chapter 4
Selection of Appropriate Security
Patterns
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4.1 Modeling of Security Pattern for Building
Repository
The first step in this approach is the creation of pattern repository. Creation of
pattern repository is done by formalizing security patterns using Goal Oriented
Requirement Language (GRL). The analyzation and decomposition of attributes,
relationships and various influences of all design/security patterns is done in few
steps and included in the repository in an orderly fashion. GRL model shows the
contribution that a security pattern make on the security related Non Functional
Requirements (NFRs), it identifies which NFR will be built and which NFR will
be hurt by the use of particular security pattern. GRL modelling also helps in
visualizing the different relationship among the patterns such as, whether a pat-
tern can co-exist with other patterns and what are the prerequisite patterns for
the particular pattern. Figure 4.1 shows intentional elements of GRL used for
modeling different attributes of security pattern. In GRL tasks are represented
by hexagonal shape and Soft Goals are represented by a cloud like curvilinear
shape. In this study tasks are modeled as security patterns and Soft Goals are
modeled as Non Functional Requirements (NFRs), contribution links are used for
specifying the contribution of security pattern towards a soft goal along with the
strength, and decomposition links are used for representing the relation among
different patterns. Strengths are specified numerically, Make (1.00), Help (0.75),
Unknown (0.50), Hurt (0.25), Break (0.00). The four well know architectural se-
curity patterns(Single Access Point, Security Session, Role-Based Access Control,
Check Point) proposed by Yoder has been considered to demonstrate proposed
approach.
GRL Intentional Elements Intention Security Pattern Modelling 
 
 
 
Tasks Specifies Security Pattern 
 
Soft Goal Represents Non Functional 
Requirements(NFRs) 
 Contribution Link Shows Make and Hurt 
contribution of Security pattern 
towards the NFRs 
 Decomposition Link Shows the relation between 
different patterns 
 
 
Figure 4.1: GRL intentional elements
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Implications of Patterns proposed by Yoder:
• Single Access Point helps in building Integrity, Confidentiality, and Account-
ability, at the same time Single Access Point hurts the Availability of system.
Single Access Point also depends on Check Point for its existence.
• Role-Based Access Control helps in building Manageability, Availability, In-
tegrity and Confidentiality.
• Security Session helps in building Availability, Integrity, Confidentiality, Ac-
countability and Usability.
• Check Point security helps in building Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability,
same forces are also built by Security Session and RBAC.
 
Check Point 
Confidentiality Integrity Availability 
make make make 
Security Session RBAC 
or or 
Figure 4.2: GRL model of Check Point Security Pattern
 
RBAC 
Confidentiality Integrity Manageability  
make make make 
Availability 
help 
Figure 4.3: GRL model of Role-Based Access Control Security Pattern
GRL model for Check Point and Role Based Access Control scrutiny pattern
is shown in Figure 4.2 and 4.3 respectively [32]. In these figures Security Pat-
terns Check Point and Role Based Access control are represented using hexagonal
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shape know as Task in GRL, tasks are connected with Non Functional Require-
ments(NFRs) through the contribution links. Contribution links can be marked
as make, help, unknown, hurt and break, this helps in deciding the strength by
which security pattern affect the connected Non Functional Requirement. Relation
among the security patterns is represented with the help of decomposition link, it
shows the relation between the two tasks. Decomposition links can be marked as
’and’ and ’or’, ’and’ contribution is positive and necessary and ’or’ contribution is
positive but not necessary.
4.1.1 Extraction of Facts from GRL Model
Fact are extracted from Goal Oriented Requirement Language (GRL) with the
help of XML and represented in the form of instance of relational algebra. Five
instances were built in order to store the security patterns.
• Instance P for storing the security pattern, it consists of two attributes ’pat-
ternid’ and ’patternname’.
• Instance NFR for storing the Non Functional Requirements (NFR), it con-
sists of two attributes ’nfrid’ and ’nfrname’.
• Instance F for storing the Non-Functional Requirement and ’patternid’ for
each NFR’s affected by a particular security pattern along with the ’strength’
by which pattern contributes to the corresponding NFR.
• Instance R for storing the relation among the pattern in order to return the
list of prerequisite patterns.
Table 4.1: Instance P
patternid patternname
1 Single Access Point
2 Role-Based Access Control
3 Security Session
4 Check Point
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Table 4.2: Instance NFR
nfrid nfrname
1 Confidentiality
2 Integrity
3 Availability
4 Accountability
5 Usability
6 Manageability
Table 4.3: Instance F
patternid nfrid strength
1 2 .75
1 1 .75
1 4 .75
1 3 .25
2 6 1
2 3 .75
2 2 1
2 1 1
3 3 .75
3 2 .75
3 1 .75
3 4 .75
3 5 .75
4 3 1
4 2 1
4 1 1
Table 4.4: Instance F
patternid1 patternid2 relation
4 3 or
4 2 or
1 4 and
4.1.2 Selection of Appropriate Security Pattern that Ful-
fills Security Requirement
Selection of the appropriate security pattern is done with the help of queries made
to the instances. For this purpose another instance Goal is created containing
the ID(bfrid) of the Non Functional Requirements (NFR) along with the required
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strength.
Fullfilled = σstrength>Goal.s and nfrid=Goal.nfrid(F ) (4.1)
Tempfulfilled = Πnfrid(Fulfilled) (4.2)
NotFulfilled = (Πnfrid(G)− Tempfulfilled) (4.3)
PatternFullfiled = (Fulfilled on P ) (4.4)
TmpPrerequisite = (Πpatternid(PatternFullfiled)) (4.5)
Fullfilled = σpatternId=TmpPrequisite.patternid(R) (4.6)
TmpPrerequisite = (Πpatternname(Πpatternid2(Tmp2Prerequisite)) on P ) (4.7)
Query ’Fulfilled’ extract the ’patternid’ of all the pattern which satisfies the
NFR’s with the strength specified in the instance ’Goal’. ’Tempfulfilled’ extract
the ’nfrid’ of the fulfilled NFR leaving behind the unfulfilled NFR’s. Subsequently,
’NonFulfilled’ extract the unfulfilled NFR’s by subtracting the ’Tempfulfilled’ from
instance the ’Goal’. Now finally to extract the name of satisfying pattern a join is
made between instance ’P’ and ’Fulfilled’ which is then stored in ’PatternFulfiled’.
Last step is to extract the dependencies in order to find the prerequisite patterns
for the selected patterns. These dependencies are extracted with the help of query
’Prerequisite’, it will extract the name of perquisite security patterns. Proposed
relational algebra can be implemented on any relational database. In this study we
made an attempt to develop a service which will allow user to select appropriate
security pattern that fulfills the required nonfunctional requirements.
Chapter 5
Detection of Security Patterns
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5.1 Detection of Security Patterns
Software maintenance is known as the most expensive one among all the phases
of software development life cycle, both in terms of money and time. Reverse
engineering activities are adopted to maintain, evolve and re-engineer the system.
Design pattern detection and software architecture reconstruction are the most
important fields of reverse engineering. Design pattern detection aims at identifi-
cation of design patterns that have been used in the implementation of a particular
system, whereas, software architecture reconstruction lets the software engineers
view different levels of abstractions of the system. Hence, the reverse engineer-
ing techniques let user focus on the overall architecture of system without having
adequate knowledge of detailed programming implementation. Security patterns
detection helps developers to find the security constrains that were focused, dur-
ing the development of system. Thus strengthening and helping in maintenance
of security related Non Functional Requirements of system.
An Eclipse plug-in i.e., MARPLE (Metrics and Architecture Reconstruction
Plug-in for Eclipse) has been developed by Fontana Et al.[40], which supports
both design pattern detection and Software architecture Reconstruction. They
have tried to improve the accuracy of result with the help of various classifiers.
5.2 Implementation
5.2.1 Hybrid Classifier
Many research have been done and it has been proven that use of hybrid classifiers
produce more accuracy than the usual ones [41] [42] [43].Naive Bayes induction
algorithms were proven to be significantly correct on many classification tasks
irrespective of assumptions made on conditional independence. Again, the cor-
rectness of Naive-Bayes is not as promising as Decision Tree classifiers. Hence,
a new hybrid classifier DTNB(Decision Tree Naive-Bayes), which induces a hy-
brid of Naive-Bayes classifiers and decision-tree classifiers is chosen. The leaves
contain Naive-Bayesian classifiers but the decision-tree nodes contain univariate
splits as regular decision-trees. The approach helps in retaining the interpretabil-
ity of Decision Tree and Naive-Bayes. Therefore, resulting in improved classifiers
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Figure 5.1: jRefactory - Composite Pattern Detection Result
Figure 5.2: jRefactory - Adapter Pattern Detection Result
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which frequently outperform both constituents, this classifiers shows drastically
improved performance especially in the larger databases. Result obtained using
MARPLE are shown in Table 5.1
Table 5.1: Result Using Similarity Score
Classifier Accuracy for Singleton
NaiveBayes 0.81
ZeroR 0.61
OneR 0.87
RandomForrest 0.93
DTNB 0.89
Application of DTNB instead of Naive-Bayes led to only a slight increase in the
accuracy of detection. Therefore similarity score method is used for the detection
of Security Patterns.
5.2.2 Detection Using Similarity Score
Similarity algorithm depends on the system graph size for convergence. Time
required for calculation of similarity score between pattern graph and all the ver-
tices of system graph gradually increases as the number of vertices of the graphs
increase [39] . In order to make the matching more efficient, graph size must be re-
duced without losing vital information for design pattern detection process. Since
most of design patterns involve hierarchies, similarity algorithm can be applied to
classes which involve inheritance structures. If a role of class is assigned a score
which is less than the score of role of another class, then the class will the lower
score should satisfy the fewer criteria as described in the pattern. The Similarity
Score Matrix S was calculated using the following algorithm [39].
1. Set Z0 = 1
2. Iterate the below equation even number of times
Zk+1 =
BZkA
T+BTZkA
||BZkAT+BTZkA||
3. Last value of Zk will give the Similarity Score Matrix Where
• A is the adjacency matrix for graphs GA and B is the adjacency matrix
of graph GB
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• Initially Z0 is filled with ones.
Figure 5.3: Assosiation Matrix For Single Access Matrix
Association graph and Association matrix for Single Access Point Security
Pattern is shown in Figure 5.3. Similarity score method was applied on open
source software JhotDraw and JRefactory. Result obtained is show in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Result Using Similarity Score
Security Pattern JhotDraw JRefactory
Single Access Point 2(TP) 0(FN)100(Recall) 12(TP) 0(FN) 100(Recall)
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
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6.1 Conclusion
6.1.1 Formalization and Validation of Security Patterns
Security is a critical issue which can’t be only based on UML diagrams, hence it
requires proper verification in terms of formal language. In this study, an attempt
has been made to propose a grammar which satisfies the security pattern language
and formally verifies the security patterns. In order to demonstrate this approach,
a case study on online banking system has been considered. For this case study,
extended UML class diagram visualizing security patterns is generated by using
UML class diagram. Single Access Point, provides a single login screen to all
external entities of the system, which helps the system to trace the unusual requests
thus maintaining the availability of the system for other entities. Check Point
ensures the confidentiality of system by authenticating the user and it also enforce
certain security policies and penalizes the user for violating security policies. The
role-based access control (RBAC) maintains the integrity of the system authorizing
the user with the help of user role-privilege relationship. RBAC also improves the
confidentiality of the system by providing access rights.
6.1.2 Selection of Appropriate Security Patterns
Formalization of security patterns has been done in order to create a repository.
Queries are made to repository in order to find the most appropriate security
pattern for the set of given security related Non Functional Requirements. This
approach not only find list of most appropriate security patterns but it also check
for the dependencies among the patterns in order to find the prerequisite patterns.
With the help of GRL security pattern were formalized subsequently facts were
extracted from the formalized security patterns. Modelling security patterns with
the help of GRL allows to accurately and effectively describe how each patterns
make a distinct contribution to a security related Non Functional Requirements.
Facts extracted from GRL were represented in form of instances for relational
database. For finding list of appropriate security pattern and prerequisite pattern,
queries written using relational algebra were made to the instances. Thus mak-
ing the following contributions: (i) relational algebra have well found semantics;
hence used for modelling the data stored in relational databases. Therefore this
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approach can be implemented as service using any relational database server. (ii)
relational databases, such as MySQL can be easily optimized even if the number
of security patterns gradually increases, where else on the other hand client side
language performance will decrease if the number of security patterns will gradu-
ally increase. (iii) in client side languages when the number of security patterns
will increase it will also lead to the increase in size of repository which will make
it difficult to distribute, where else on the other hand in this approach, repository
is stored in server and an interface for making query to the server is provided. (iv)
this approach will help in creating a centralized pool of security patterns, where all
the available security patterns are stored in the repository on the server. Security
Patterns Search Engine[44] was developed by using this approach. As a result,
security patterns were formalized which help in identifying the implications and
liability imposed by patterns which are not easy to identify in case of textual rep-
resentation, approach for finding appropriate security patterns and corresponding
prerequisite patterns with the help of relation algebra has been proposed.
6.1.3 Detection of Security Patterns
This method provides a approach to o detect security patterns in the source code of
a software. In the field of Software Reverse Engineering, this approach to detect
security pattern instances in a software, is quite adoptable as it automatically
detects design patterns. The use of Similarity Score method in the process of
design pattern detection provides a way not only to detect full occurrence of the
pattern but it also provides a measure to find the percentage matching of the
pattern. This method is useful for software engineers to get knowledge about
the pattern existence in the system. MARPLE has been to extract the security
pattern candidate from the source code of the system.
6.2 Future Work
A good number of security patterns can be added in order to extend the pattern
language. As per now, the association of classes is being checked. Grammar can be
extended for verifying the operations of class and role played by these operations
under security pattern. It means if a class contains some operation playing some
role under security pattern , then grammar can be developed to verify whether this
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class declaration satisfies the pattern language or not. This will help developer
to resolve security issues at development stage itself, thus leading to rapid devel-
opment of software and saving lots of time invested in testing. Functionalities of
proposed approach can be developed as an extension for widely used UML drawing
software solutions such as IBM Rational Rose. Basic fundamental advantage of
security patterns is reusability, for this purpose XML file can be generated and
saved for further use, also skeleton source code can be generated out of the UML
class diagram for several programming languages.
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